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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DeANN H. JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 20070885 
COMES NOW the Defendant/Appellant with this her Reply Brief and alleges that 
two new points have been introduced into the litigation by inclusion in Appellee's Brief and 
Defendant/Appellant is compelled to address the same and does so as follows: 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When Judges and Legislators are allowed to trump the Constitution and except from the 
Rule of Law it visits disgrace and insecurity on us all. 
Defendant/Appellant suggests that the statute in question is not really a creature of State 
Law at all, but was a blind reenactment of a provisions engrafted from the Federal system, which 
system takes quite another view of privilege and confidentiality and as to its importance within 
the ordered system of government upon which all of us rely. 
As to the origin of the law in question, our representatives adopted the federal legislation 
when it became the law of that jurisdiction. 
1 
The I 'tali legislature, in SPIIII1 t , N ^ l'-^ •»< I'lccluJ in " oii'-nk1' \hv i H I a e n e c ^ "ihi i n 
the two systems; the Federal Law Rules o l 'L \ idence an and were always intended to be a 
product of the Legislat ive branch of that government, n
 t *;. o > ( ,* - U;; generat ions of struggling 
\ •! 11 ! leral system, the people opted to 
modify the Utah State Consti tution and thereby conferred the power rn (he ••uiieian •<• nrini: 
just ice and constancy to trials, and pro\ u . ^ • . - o 
coiuliu:! trials is onlv to be taken from the j u d i c i a l '-p^a a m o s t part icularized process which 
process does not apply to the instant case. 
P atl lei than cc 
Appellee asks this court to determine that the ; _^_ •, '_>c^  net a;-pK a a transaction such as the one 
that underlies the instant case. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii) 
Utah Code Annotated 58-60-113 
Utah Rules ol hudenee :S06 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. There was no proof offered at the Preliminary Hearing nor was r~" 
required which indicated that Defendant/Appellant acted or failed to act in orih 
perpetrate a Fraud and Appellee's adoption of a presumption tends to violate 
Defendant's Due Process guarantees. 
1. The first new and no\ el argument of Plaintiff/Appellee presumes that 
Defendant/Appellant's series of contacts with one of her treating physicians, Dr. Jaussi, 
were arranged with the primary purpose in mind to fraudulei itl> obtaining prescription 
2 
drugs in excess of therapeutic doses. There was no evidence adduced before the 
magistrate as to the intent of Appellant. The fact is that a patient neglects or otherwise 
fails to advise the treating physician that the patient had otherwise obtained prescription 
drugs may impose a strict liability on the patient, proof of the cause of the oversight 
was neither required nor offered by either party and said oversight might well have arisen 
from any one of many possible causes including a manifestation of the very disease or 
condition that beset the Defendant/Appellant at the time she sought treatment. 
2. By assuming that the drugs were solicited by the patient with fraudulent 
intent and not for the purpose of obtaining treatment, Appellee seeks to shift the burden 
of persuasion from the Plaintiff/Appellee to the Defendant/Appellant regarding proof of 
an element in a criminal Trial, a constitutionally impermissible maneuver State vs. 
Sorenson 758 P.2d 466 (1988) 88 Ut Adv Rep 3. (Appendix A) 
3. In the Sorenson case the Utah Court of Appeals held that the Court may not 
constitutionally presume that consumption of alcohol occurred in Utah beyond a 
reasonable doubt. While neither party contends that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
required to bind Defendant/Appellant over for Trial, the principles of due process 
espoused in State and Federal cases would seem to apply equally to the issues of this case. 
4. At the Preliminary Hearing stage the burden imposed on the Prosecution 
requires proof that a single individual committed each element of the charged crime and 
that proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt. As to the identity of the perpetrator it 
3 
need onl> be show n tl lat there is a reasonable prob lat the accused commit' 
samur ll r nihil ' ;i 1 rI llnl il llur hrliiimniv He* ismilinn is .nailf 
presumptions and inferences available under the law. Defendant/Appellant argues 
without fear of contradiction that the presumption claimed by Appellee is not available. 
5. The latitude granted at I Preliminary Hearing does not icquirc llial lli 
accused riiiir.l ill illli iihscmv I piool Ilk lllic pi'oscciiilioii otln I'viilrmv In dispinsv amy 
element; American jurisprudence does not avail an) party any such presumption In re 
Winship 397 U.S 358(1970), (Appendix B) • • 
Point II. No presumption exists in the law that failure to advise a treating 
physician pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii) (Appendix C) provides 
proof nor does any doctrine purport to raise an inference that Defendant did so with 
fraudulent intent 
( If the "I rial Coi irt were to accept or be 'required to credit the hearsay proof 
that the treating physician was, for wl latever reason,, unwilling or unable to pro\ ide 
e ci o , !1 
be thereby required to elicit anu incivi - - -ublieize confidential and privileged information 
regarding the medical condition iMhi accused and of the treatment she has undergone, 
all in order to mot mt a delcnse (If indeed sucl I a defense is even available). Sui el> , by 
lliih siiijiiilai IH:\I i1 "ill nflhr li.nlilinii ill null's nil Pliiiiiilifl iiiiill I liicinliiiil nil llln; i IHHIIIU il Il ,i 
criminal trial, Defendant would be compelled to the position of presenting otherwise 
privileged information and, by that act, waive the privilege and confidentiality which 
attaches to the physician/patient relationship. Perhaps more importanth L.H. I . . 
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pit the Defendant/Appellant against the attending Physician and thereby jeopardize the 
health and well being of the accused. 
7. The statute under which Defendant is prosecuted requires proof that 
Defendant did, on the 7th day of June, 2006 in Cache County, State of Utah obtain a 
prescription and in so doing failed to disclose that Defendant had, by way of prescription 
obtained any controlled substance from another physician (emphasis mine). The proofs 
urged by Appellee were not offered at preliminary hearing and the evidence taken at the 
preliminary hearing introduced no suggestion into the record which would tend to ratify 
the argument at pgs. 18-20 of Plaintiff/Appellee's Brief wherein it is said that: 
"In any case, evidence that Defendant was legitimately seeing Dr. Jaussi 
could provide a trial defense, but would not negate the preliminary hearing 
evidence that she unlawfully obtained narcotics from the doctor by 
concealing her multiple other narcotics prescriptions. For contrary to 
Defendant's assertion, Br. Aplt. At 22-23, an element of prescription fraud 
is not that the doctor-patient relationship is fraudulent at its inception, but 
that the administration of drugs was procured under false pretenses. 
Defendant further argues that no negative inference of a fraudulent intent 
can be inferred from her silence. Br.Aplt. at 19-22. The marshaled 
evidence negates this assertion and supports the trial court's conclusion that 
no privilege exists and that admissible evidence, including Dr. Jaussi's 
statement, supports bindover.. .Moreover, during the four months 
Defendant obtained narcotics prescriptions from Dr. Jaussi, she continued 
to obtain the same narcotics from other sources, but never communicated 
this to Dr. Jaussi. This evidence establishes probable cause that Defendant 
unlawfully shopped doctors for drugs. In sum, the trial court correctly 
concluded that no privilege exists under rule 506, correctly found the 
evidence sufficient to support bindover, and properly denied the motion to 
quash."1 (Appendix D) 
l Appellant suggests that proof that Defendant was legitimately seeing Dr. Jaussi would 
not constitute a defense in light of the language of the statute as presently enacted and 
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8. The assertions within Appellant's argument do not arise from the 
marshalling of evidence taken at the preliminary hearing and do not support any fact 
offered at the preliminary hearing. The argument of the government only presumes that 
due to information found on a database available only to the government, that the 
Defendant/Appellant was doctor shopping. Information from that database does not infer 
or even suggest guilt, it only provides information which may be drawn upon for 
legitimate enquiries which inquiries might not relate to criminal conduct at all. Appellant, 
when the State sought to introduce the data base evidence, objected thereto on various 
grounds which objections were overruled. 
9. The Appellees argument that the provision in Title 58 does not invade the 
sanctity of the Doctor-Patient privilege ignores the unavoidable result that such testimony 
permitted thereby would ultimately expose the entire spectrum of the confidentiality 
inherent in the physician/patient privilege to public view. 
10. In the case of Story vs. Superior Court (People) (2003), 109 Cal. App. 4th 
1007 the California Court said: 
"We agree with the Petitioner. The California Supreme Court has 
established that the motive for participating in psychotherapy is immaterial 
to determining whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege attaches. 
(Mendez v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 435, 454.) Therefore, the fact 
that a Defendant was motivated to participate in psychotherapy as a 
condition of probation does not bar application of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege to the records of that psychotherapy." (Appendix E) 
such proof would do nothing to refute the presumption Appellee envisions 
6 
Although the privilege addressed in the California case relates to a psychotherapist 
as opposed to a physician, the question related to the privilege/confidential relationship is 
applicable to physician/patient relationship present in the instant case as well. 
Interestingly, in Utah the psychotherapist/patient privilege finds its preliminary basis in 
statutory law while the physician patient privilege arises within Rules of Evidence.(2) 
Looking at Ryan vs. Gold Cross Services, Inc. 903 P.2d 423, 273 Utah (1995) (Appendix 
F) is the mental health therapist exclusion a rule or may that rule be disregarded by the 
Trial judge? 
11. In DeBry v. Goates 999 P.2d 582 360 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (2000) (Appendix 
G) this Court held that the controlling fact is a determination as to whether the encounter 
is for the purpose of treatment. Let us assume that in the instant case, the 
Defendant/Appellant was referred by her regular physician on account of a sports injury 
largely confined to the eye.(3) While this fact may not be clearly established by the 
evidence presented at the abbreviated factual inquiry which provided the basis for 
Defendant/Appellant's objections salient to this Appeal, certainly the position of the 
2 But see 58-60-113 UCA (Appendix H) as Amended which provides as follows, 
"Evidentiary privilege for mental health therapists regarding admissibility of any 
confidential communication in administrative, civil, or criminal proceedings is in 
accordance with Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." (Appendix J) 
3 Interestingly Appellee's argument and the assumptions indulged therein presumes to 
compel the Appellant to disclose privileged information to prove her innocence and 
Appellee thereby contrives to make a presumed medical condition (Addiction) a fact issue 
in the instant case. 
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Plaintiff/Appellee that the medical visit was for a fraudulent purpose or solely in order to 
secure an additional source for prescription drugs is not made manifest within the 
evidence taken at preliminary hearing. Based on that reasoning alone, the protestation 
that Appellant's failed to marshal the evidence to support her position is of no real 
consequence. 
12. While as a first impression one might ask, "What does the reason for the 
medical visit have to do with the issue as to why the Defendant/Appellant did not disclose 
other drug sources to her treating physician?" Appellant contends that not only was 
Defendant/Appellant entitled to expect non-disclosure of the particulars of her visit to Dr. 
Jaussi but in view of the possibly limited nature of her consultation she need not disclose 
her entire medical history to a doctor whose treatment focused on a presumably non-
related condition when that limited treatment may well have been at the direction of 
Defendant/Appellant's primary physician. 
13. Most importantly of all, the statutory provision that Defendant/Appellant 
must affirmatively disclose aspects of medical treatment to anyone virtually abolishes the 
protection based on the privileged and confidential nature of such communications. If the 
statute truly creates an irrebuttable presumption (or even a rebuttable one) the statute 
destroys the basis for the privilege; Defendant/Appellant must disclose all, first to any 
treating physician and ultimately at a public trial where the only issue contested is 
whether adequate disclosure was in fact. 
8 
14. The argument advanced by Appellee presupposes that Defendant/Appellant 
must first submit to unlimited enquiry by a physician even, by a physician without any 
"need to know" and then ultimately must reveal all at a public hearing in order to explain 
why no information was volunteered, or worse yet, to explain that Defendant/Appellant 
had advised the physician of all of the particulars of prior and other treatments revealing 
thereby intimate details regarding those confidential disclosures in order to bolster the 
testimony that the Doctor was mistaken or forgetful or even acting out of malevolent 
intent, whereupon the prosecution could then rely on that "waiver" and thereby place 
Defendant's entire medical history at issue. 
15. The unavoidable result obtained, if Plaintiff/Appellee's theory is espoused, 
will disrupt the entire scheme of privilege fashioned within the Law of Evidence. One 
way or the other, Defendant/Appellant will be forced to abandon the confidentiality that is 
guaranteed by Utah Law. Even more shocking, why shouldn't the legislature fashion a 
law requiring certain initial disclosures during the initial Attorney/client interaction 
which, if not volunteered, would constitute a crime? By this requirement, the law would 
thereby pit the client against the Attorney whereby the Attorney would thus be compelled 
to ultimately reveal all of the confidences of his client and thereafter render nothing but 
disservice to that client. 
CONCLUSION 
The point which should be apparent from reading the submissions by the 
9 
parties to this appeal is that the Appellee makes entirely too miicli in answer to the sir -
question "in Utah is a patient entitled to rely on the protections afforded the doctor-patient 
relationship by the Rules of Evidence?" 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed as true and correct copy of the foregoing, REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to the following listed below on the 26th day 
of September, 2008. 
Christine F. Soltis, Esq. 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
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ADDENDUM 
(None Required) 
APPENDIX A 
State vs. Sorenson 758 P.2d 466 (1988) 88 Ut Adv Rep 3 
07/27/88 STATE UTAH v. RANDY J. SORENSON 
[ 1 ] COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
[2] No. 870150-CA 
[3] 1988.UT.180 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 758 P.2d 466, 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
[4] July 27, 1988 
[5] STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
v. 
RANDY J. SORENSON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
[6] Ninth Circuit Court, Washington County, St. George Dept, Cr No 87-CR-0190, Hon. 
Robert F. Owens 
[7] G. Michael Westfall (Argued), Gallian & Westfall, Attorneys for Appellant, St. George, UT 
[8] Paul Graf, Washington County Attorney, W. Brent Langston (Argued), Deputy County 
Attorney, St. George, UT 
[9] Before Gregory K. Orme, Judge, Russell W. Bench, Judge, and Richard C. Davidson, 
Judge, Concur 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Orme 
[11] FACTS. - Sorenson, a minor, was pulled over for speeding in St. George, and the officer 
noted alcohol on his breath but did not conduct a sobriety test. Sorenson became belligerent, 
and the officer arrested him for possession of alcohol, although there were no external 
indications of alcohol. 
[12] PROCEEDINGS. - Sorenson was convicted of possession by a minor, and appealed. 
[13] RESULT. - Reversed. Per Orme; Bench & Davidson concur. 
[14] HELD. - Court may not constitutionally presume that consumption of alcohol occurred in 
APPENDIX B 
In Re Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970) 
WINSHIP, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 03/31/1970) 
[1 ] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
[2] No. 778 
[3] 90 S. Ct. 1068, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 1970.SCT.41203 
<http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] decided: March 31, 1970. 
[5] IN RE WINSHIP 
[6] APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. 
[7] Rena K. Uviller argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was William E. 
Hellerstein. 
[8] Stanley Buchsbaum argued the cause for the City of New York, appellee. With him on the 
brief was J. Lee Rankin. 
[9] Marie S. Klooz filed a brief for the Neighborhood Legal Services Program of Washington, 
D.C., et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. 
[10] Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, pro se, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant 
Attorney General, and Marie L. Marcus, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the 
Attorney General of New York as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 
[11] Author: Brennan 
[ 397 U.S. Page 358] 
[ 12] MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
[13] Constitutional questions decided by this Court concerning the juvenile process have 
centered on the adjudicatory stage at "which a determination is made as to 
APPENDIX C 
Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii) 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license 
number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose 
of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a 
manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized 
person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, 
to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to 
acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance 
by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance 
from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to 
utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of 
this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to 
print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or 
device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling 
so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D - Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this 
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, 
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if 
the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those 
schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of 
any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, 
at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution 
under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or 
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds 
included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or 
distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any 
correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
APPENDIX D 
l'aj»r IS 20 of Plaintiff/Appellee's Brief 
enforcement is entitled to access. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-7.5(4)-(8) (West Supp. 
2007). See also BrAplt. at 17 (conceding that pharmaceutical records are not 
privileged). 
Defendant asserts that rule 506 protects from disclosure evidence of her drug 
addiction. See BrAplt. at 15-16 (citing only Colorado's privilege rule in support). 
The claim, whether true or not, is irrelevant because no evidence of Defendant's 
addiction was disclosed to Dr. Jaussi; it was concealed (R. 130). 
C. The trial court correctly found the preliminary hearing sufficient 
to support the bindover. 
Intermingled with Defendant's claim that rule 506 applies, is her assertion 
that no evidence establishes that she procured the prescriptions under false 
pretenses and, consequently, that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
bindover. The contention is without merit. 
The trial court found that Defendant's failure to inform Dr. Jaussi of the other 
prescriptions was fraudulent (R. 130). Defendant, on the other hand, claims the 
failure was merely negligent. BrAplt. at 21-22. According to Defendant, she had 
recently been injured and contacted Dr. Jaussi out of a "desire for treatment". 
BrAplt. at 22-23. See also BrAplt. at 18, 21 n.4,22 n.5, App. F at 1-2 & Exh. A, App. 
KK & App. LL. The trial court rejected Defendant's unfounded assertion because no 
evidence of Defendant's injury or treatment was presented at the preliminary 
18 
hearing (R238:8). Instead, Defendant asserted these "facts" for the first time in her 
memoranda in support of her motion to quash. 
In any case, evidence that Defendant was legitimately seeing Dr. Jaussi could 
provide a trial defense, but would not negate the preliminary hearing evidence that 
she unlawfully obtained narcotics from the doctor by concealing her multiple other 
narcotics prescriptions. For contrary to Defendant's assertion, Br. Aplt. at 22-23, an 
element of prescription fraud is not that the doctor-patient relationship is fraudulent 
at its inception, but that the administration of drugs was procured under false 
pretenses. 
It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally... to obtain 
a prescription for... any controlled substance by misrepresentation or 
failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance 
from another source. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii) (Add. A). 
Defendant further argues that no negative inference of a fraudulent intent can 
be inferred from her silence. Br.Aplt. at 19-22. The marshaled evidence negates this 
assertion and supports the trial court's conclusion that no privilege exists and that 
admissible evidence, including Dr. Jaussi's statement, supports bindover. For 
example, during the last two weeks of May, Defendant continually obtained 
hydrocodone prescriptions from Dr. Bedell (R. 58). The first week of June, she 
obtained more hydrocodone from Dr. Jaussi (R. 58,121; R281.18). Two weeks later, 
19 
she obtained 135 tablets of hydrocodone from Dr. Bedell (R. 112). Four days later, 
she obtained Endocet, a form of oxycodone, from Dr. Jaussi (R. 112; R281:18). As 
Detective Italasano testified, Defendant's pattern in obtaining these drugs indicates 
fraud (R281: 7). Moreover, during the four months Defendant obtained narcotics 
prescriptions from Dr. Jaussi, she continued to obtain the same narcotics from other 
sources, but never communicated this to Dr. Jaussi. See Statement of Facts, supra, at 7-
8. This evidence establishes probable cause that Defendant unlawfully shopped 
doctors for drugs. 
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that no privilege exists under rule 
506, correctly found the evidence sufficient to support bindover, and properly 
denied the motion to quash. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT NO 
PRIVILEGE ATTACHED UNDER SECTION 58-37-6(9) AND, 
THEREFORE, THE DOCTOR'S STATEMENT WAS 
ADMISSIBLE 
The trial court alternatively and correctly concluded that section 58-37-6(9), 
the drug-fraud exception, precluded privilege because Defendant's failure to 
disclose was done to unlawfully procure narcotics (R. 128-31) (Add. A & B). 
20 
APPENDIX E 
Story vs. Superior Court (People) (2003), 109 Cal. App. 4th 1007 
Page 1 
1 of 1 DOCUMENT 
GARY DEAN STORY, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA 
CLARA COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. 
No. H024993. 
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 
109 Cal. App. 4th 1007; 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532; 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 865; 2003 Cal. 
Daily Op. Service 5108; 2003 Daily Journal DAR 6466 
June 12, 2003, Decided 
June 12, 2003, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Santa Clara County Superior Court Santa Clara County Super Ct No 210711 Hon. 
Rene Navarro 
DISPOSITION: Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent court to vacate its order granting the 
motion of real party in interest to allow release of petitioner's Veterans' Administration Hospital psychotherapy records 
pursuant to subpoena duces tecum and denying petitioner's motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum, and to enter a 
new order denying the motion to allow release of petitioner's Veterans' Administration Hospital psychotherapy records 
pursuant to subpoena duces tecum and granting the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum The temporary stay 
order is vacated, effective upon finality of this decision 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner inmate sought extraordinary relief from the order of respondent, the Santa 
Clara County Superior Court, California, denying his motion to quash the People's subpoena duces tecum and allowing 
release of his psychotherapy records. 
OVERVIEW: The inmate's petition raised an issue of first impression in the area of prosecutorial discovery: whether 
the records of psychotherapy ordered as a condition of probation were protected from disclosure in a subsequent 
criminal action where the prosecution sought Cal. Evid. Code § 1108 evidence regaxdmg the inmate's commission of a 
previous sexual offense. The inmate contended that the psychotherapist-patient privilege set forth in Cal. Evid. Code § 
1014 barred discovery of his psychotherapy records. The appellate court agreed with the inmate. His motive for 
participating in psychotherapy was immaterial to determining whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege attached 
OUTCOME: The appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order 
allowing the release of the inmate's psychotherapy records pursuant tojsubpoena duces tecum. The superior court was 
directed to issue a new order granting the motion to quash thesubpofena^duces^tecuni. ^ ^ i .
 S \ ^ ^ ^ J r -
CORE TERMS: psychotherapy, psychotherapist-patient, probation, patient, psychotherapist's, disclosure, condition of 
probation, discovery, privileged, subpoena duces tecum, sexually, dominant purpose, confidential, emotional, claimant, 
predator's, violent, therapy, murder, discovery orders, preliminary facts, confidentiality, rehabilitation, recommendation, 
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09/20/95 SARA RYAN v. GOLD CROSS SERVICES 
[1] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 940289 
[3] 1995.UT.16053 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 903 P.2d 423, 273 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 
[4] September 20, 1995 
[5] SARA RYAN, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF S.S., A MINOR, PLAINTIFF, 
v. 
GOLD CROSS SERVICES, INC., DBA GOLD CROSS AMBULANCE, AND 
WILLIAM J. SLUSHER, DEFENDANTS. GOLD CROSS SERVICES, INC., DBA 
GOLD CROSS AMBULANCE, AND WILLIAM J. SLUSHER, THIRD-PARTY 
PLAINTIFFS AND PETITIONERS, V. SUZANNE O. SMITH, THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT. 
[6] Third District, Salt Lake County. The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki. 
[7] Craig G. Adamson, Eric P. Lee, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
[8] Gary B. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for petitioners. 
[9] Stuart L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
[10] Durham, Justice: Michael D. Zimmerman, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Justice, Leonard 
H. Russon, Justice. 
[11] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Durham 
[12] DURHAM, Justice : 
[13] We granted an interlocutory appeal from a Third District Court ruling upholding the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-186 and denying defendants' motion to admit at 
trial evidence of plaintiff s nonuse of an available safety belt. Gold Cross Services, Inc., dba 
Gold Cross Ambulance, and William J. Slusher (collectively "Gold Cross") argue that the 
statute acts as a rule of evidence and is therefore a legislative intrusion on the rule-making 
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Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58 (Utah App. 03/09/2000) 
[1] IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
[2] Case No. 981420-CA 
[3] 2000 UT App 58, 2000.UT.0042058 <http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] March 9, 2000 
[5] JANICE L. DEBRY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, 
v. 
DELBERT T. GOATES, M.D., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. 
[6] Attorneys: Bel-Ami De Montreux, Salt Lake City, for Appellant Mark L. McCarty and P. 
Keith Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
[7] Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Orme. 
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Billings, Judge 
[9] OPINION 
[ 10] (For Official Publication) 
[11] Third District, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
[12] |1 Plaintiff Janice Debry appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in her 
malpractice claim in favor of defendant Dr. Delbert Goates. Debry argues that the court 
erred in determining she had no therapist-patient relationship with Dr. Goates, and that even 
if a relationship was established, she could not assert the privilege because her mental state 
was put at issue in the divorce proceeding. We reverse. 
[13] BACKGROUND 
[14] Tf2 M,[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. We state the 
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58-60-113. Evidentiary privilege. 
Evidentiary privilege for mental health therapists regarding admissibility of any confidential 
communication in administrative, civil, or criminal proceedings is in accordance with Rule 506 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Enacted by Chapter 32, 1994 General Session 
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APPENDIX J 
Utah Rules of Evidence 506 
Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient. 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a physician or mental health therapist. 
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed, to practice medicine in any 
state. 
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed or certified in 
any state as a physician, psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family therapist, advanced practice 
registered nurse designated as a registered psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, or professional counselor while that 
person is engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addition. 
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating 
the patient, a patient has a privilege, dunng the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) 
information obtained by examination of the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental 
health therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or 
mental health therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's family who are present to further the interest of the 
patient because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communications, or participation in the diagnosis 
and treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health therapist. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. 
The person who was the physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication is presumed to have 
authority during the life of the patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or 
emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, or, after 
the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of the claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for 
mental illness, if the mental health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in 
need of hospitalization; 
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made in the course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered 
examination of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or witness, unless the court in 
ordering the examination specifies otherwise. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 506 is modeled after Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and is intended to supersede Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
24-8(4) and 58-25a-8. There is no corresponding federal rule. By virtue of Rule 501, marriage and family therapists are not 
covered by this Rule. 
The differences between existing § 78-24-8 and Rule 506 are as follows: 
(1) Rule 506 specifically applies to psychotherapists and licensed psychologists, it being the opinion of the Committee that 
full disclosure of information by a patient in those settings is as critical as and as much to be encouraged as in the 
"physician" patient setting. The Utah Supreme Court requested that Rule 506 further apply to licensed clinical social 
workers. To meet this request, the Committee included such individuals within the definition of psychotherapists. Under Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-35-2(5), the practice of clinical social work "means the application of an established body of knowledge and 
professional skills in the practice of psychotherapy. . . ." Section 58-35-6 provides that "[n]o person may engage in the 
practice of clinical social work unless that person: (1) is licensed under this chapter as a certified social worker," has the 
requisite experience, and has passed an examination. Section 58-35-8(4) refers to licenses and certificates for "clinical social 
worker[s]." As a result of including clinical social workers, Rule 506 is intended to supplant Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-10 in 
total for all social workers. 
(2) Rule 506 applies to both civil and criminal cases, whereas § 78-24-8 applies only to civil cases. The Committee was of 
the opinion that the considerations supporting the privilege apply in both. 
(3) In the Committee's original recommendation to the Utah Supreme Court, the proposed Rule 506 granted protection only 
to confidential communications, but did not extend the privilege to observations made, diagnosis or treatment by the 
physician/psychotherapist. The Committee was of the opinion that while the traditional protection of the privilege should 
extend to confidential communications, as is the case in other traditional privileges, the interests of society in discovering 
the truth during the trial process outweigh any countervailing interests in extending the protection to observations made, 
diagnosis or treatment. However, the Supreme Court requested that the scope of the privilege be broadened to include 
information obtained by the physician or psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment, whether obtained verbally 
from the patient or through the physician's or psychotherapist's observation or examination of the patient. The Court further 
requested that the privilege extend to diagnosis, treatment, and advice. To meet these requests, the Committee relied in 
part on language from the California evidentiary privileges involving physicians and psychotherapists. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 
992 and 1012. These features of the rule appear in subparagraphs (a)(4) and (b). The Committee also relied on language 
from Uniform Rule of Evidence 503. 
Upon the death of the patient, the privilege ceases to exist. 
The privilege extends to communications to the physician or psychotherapist from other persons who are acting in the 
interest of the patient, such as family members or others who may be consulted for information needed to help the patient. 
The privilege includes those who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or 
psychotherapist. For example, a certified social worker practicing under the supervision of a clinical social worker would be 
included. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-6. 
The patient is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential communication, but also to prevent disclosure by the 
physician or psychotherapist or others who were properly involved or others who overheard, without the knowledge of the 
patient, the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are dealt with by Rule 507. 
The Committee felt that exceptions to the privilege should be specifically enumerated, and further endorsed the concept that 
in the area of exceptions, the rule should simply state that no privilege existed, rather than expressing the exception in 
terms of a "waiver" of the privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any possible clashes with the common law concepts of 
"waiver." 
The Committee did not intend this rule to limit or conflict with the health care data statutes listed in the Committee Note to 
Rule 501. 
Rule 506 is not intended to override the child abuse reporting requirements contained in Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-501 et 
seq. 
The 1994 amendment to Rule 506 was primarily in response to legislation enacted during the 1994 Legislative General 
Session that changed the licensure requirements for certain mental health professionals. The rule now covers 
communications with additional licensed professionals who are engaged in treatment and diagnosis of mental or emotional 
conditions, specifically certified social workers, marriage and family therapists, specially designated advanced practice 
registered nurses and professional counselors. 
Some mental health therapists use the term "client" rather than "patient," but for simplicity this rule uses only "patient." 
The committee also combined the definition of confidential communication and the general rule section, but no particular 
substantive change was intended by the reorganization. 
